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Abstract
Endogenous timing can help to derive the time structure of decision
making instead of assuming it as exogenously given. In our study we
consider a homogeneous market where, like in the model of Kreps
and Scheinkman (1983), sellers determine “sales capacities” before
prices. Sellers must serve customers, but at higher costs when
demand exceeds “capacitiy”. Our model allows for preemption in
“capacity” as well as in price determination. Since preemption
means to decide before the random choice of cost parameters
reflecting the stochastic nature of (excess) “capacity” costs,
preemptive commitments are no obviously better timing
dispositions.














Ever since Cournot (1838) quantity competition on homogeneous markets has
played an important role in micro-economics. But selling a certain amount and
leaving it to the market at which price this amount is sold is only possible on
markets with especially designed trade institutions like commodity or stock ex-
changes. Such institutions allow sellers to abstain from own pricing policies. If
such institutions exist, one should, however, incorporate them when modelling
homogeneous markets with quantity competition.
When costly institutions like (commodity or stock) exchanges do not exist, quan-
tity competition is hardly an acceptable idea: What is a seller supposed to answer
to the ﬁrst customer asking for the price? To overcome the obvious absurdity
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) have oﬀered a natural reinterpretation of quan-
tity competition on homogeneous markets and of the results by Cournot (1838).
Quantity competition is seen as the ﬁrst stage of a two stage-market decision
process: First sellers state their sales capacities which then become commonly
known. Then, knowing the available capacities, sellers choose their individual
sales prices.
According to the solution play sellers choose capacities matching the quantities
of quantity competition (Cournot, 1838) and rely, on the second stage, on the
price for which the sum of these capacities is demanded. Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983) analyse only duopoly markets and assume a special rationing scheme:
In subgames with larger capacities than the (Cournot-) solution quantities the
seller with the lower price may not be able to serve all his customers. The resid-
ual demand for the seller with the higher price then depends crucially on whom
the cheaper seller serves, respectively on whom he does not serve. Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983) rely on the rationing scheme maximizing consumer sur-
plus, i.e. the cheaper seller serves customers with the higher willingness to pay
(see the partly critical discussion by Davidson and Deneckere, 1986).
1In our view, the basic idea of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) is very intuitive and
should not be questioned by debatable assumptions of rationing and consequences
like equilibria in mixed pricing strategies (in case of “too large” capacities prices
have to be chosen randomly). One possibility is to rely on less rigorous cost
functions. According to Kreps and Scheinkman a capacity is an upper bound
for sales. This can be rephrased by saying that at the capacity level the costs of
production are prohibitively large. What we will consider here is a similar jump in
the cost of production at the capacity level, but only a moderate one. Given that
capacities pose no longer absolute upper bounds for sales one can avoid rationing
and equilibria in mixed pricing strategies by assuming that sellers must serve their
customers.
Two other rather special assumptions of the model, analyzed by Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983), are the deterministic framework and the simultaneity of capacity, respec-
tively price choices. In our analysis both, simultaneous as well as asynchronous
timing of capacity and price decisions are possible. Whereas delaying one’s de-
cisions allows for choosing when more information (about cost parameters and
about others’ choices) is available, early decisions can mean to preempt, i.e. to
possibly enjoy the so-called ﬁrst mover advantages. Are simultaneous decisions
the likely result when there is cost uncertainty and when one can commit to
one’s action before or after the respective cost uncertainty is resolved? If so, is
the probable market outcome still the one of quantity competition as analyzed
by Cournot (1838)? Partly our study can be seen as an attempt to analyze the
robustness of the Kreps and Scheinkman-result when cost uncertainty and asyn-
chronous timing are possible where we rely on a weaker notion of “capacities” as
in Güth (1995). Partly it is an exercise in endogenous timing on markets with
a richer stage structure due to the original two stage-structure of the Kreps and
Scheinkman-model.
Studies of endogenous timing or indirect evolution try to derive — instead of impos-
ing exogenously — the timing of market decisions (see van Damme and Hurkens,
1999, for a brief review). In our model sellers can determine their “capacities” be-
fore or after the random choice of the constant unit (capacity) costs, i.e. the ﬁrst
2stage of the Kreps and Scheinkman-model now consists of three successive sub-
stages (preemption, chance move, adjustment). By determining his sales capacity
earlier a seller can try to preempt his competitor, similar to the sequential duopoly
solution (von Stackelberg, 1934). Although this will be less important, we also
allow for three substages on the second stage of the Kreps and Scheinkman-model
(preemption in price setting, random choice of constant unit (excess capacity)
cost, cost dependent choice).
(Endogenous)Timing of market activities before or after uncertainty is resolved
has been studied by Spencer and Brander (1992) and Sadanand and Sadanand
(1996). The results are mixed in the sense that all ﬁrms may prefer to wait (for the
sake of ﬂexibility) or to preempt or that asymmetric timing positions are stable.
Here we are not primarily interested in deriving similar results for more complex
market models although we derive general preemption and general waiting for
speciﬁc examples. As mentioned before, our main focus is on analyzing whether
the reinterpretation of the classical Cournot results (Cournot, 1838), supplied by
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), survives when its highly restrictive institutional
assumptions do not hold: In the ﬁrst place we avoid rationing schemes and mixed
strategies by forcing sellers to serve customers beyond their planned sales amounts.
Second we allow sellers to choose freely whether to choose planned sales amounts,
the so-called capacities, and prices early or late. Only if the Cournot results carry
over to such a more general setting they are, in our opinion, substantially justiﬁed
by Kreps and Scheinkman.
Unfortunately, the price for the richness of institutional details in our framework
is a loss of analytical tractability. It will be shown that results depend crucially
on the stochastic nature of costs. It is in this respect where we can just provide
examples instead of oﬀering general results. Nevertheless, our numerical examples
allow already some interesting insights: The Cournot results are neither a mere
artifact of the restrictive assumptions, imposed by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983),
nor the general solution under all possible circumstances. We identify classes
of cost distributions implying Cournot, respectively non-Cournot results. We
cannot yet answer whether our results cover the full range of possible outcomes
3or characterize under which conditions which result can be expected. In our view,
the problem is, however, too important to delay its discussion until analytical
results are obtained.
In section 2 we introduce our market model which we solve in section 3 for all
possible constellations of timing dispositions. Based on these results we deﬁne
in section 4 an evolutionary game or truncation by which, in section 5, we can
derive the evolutionarily stable or optimal timing dispositions. After concluding
the Appendix illustrates the multiplicity of price equilibria and how to select one
of these.
2. The model
On the homogeneous duopoly market the two (risk neutral) sellers i =1 ,2 ﬁrst
have to determine their planned sales amounts ki a n dt h e nt h e i ra c t u a ls a l e s
prices. To allow for an easy terminology we refer to the planned sales amounts ki
as capacities although actual sales amounts xi can be higher (as well as lower).
Due to our distinction between capacities ki and actual sales amounts xi ac o s t
function Ci(·) must assign a cost level Ci(ki,x i) to every constellation (ki,x i) of
capacity ki and sales amount xi. For the sake of simplicity we rely on piecewise
linear cost functions of the form











for i =1 ,2 and where the positive parameters
C and D are assumed to be stochastic variables whose realizations, denoted by c
and d, are the same for both sellers.
The idea of such cost functions is that a seller plans for a speciﬁcs a l e sv o l u m eki.
The costs for “capacity” ki a r es u n k ,i . e .m u s tb ep a i de v e ni nc a s eo fl o w e rs a l e s
than ki.I nc a s eo fap o s i t i v ee x c e s sd e m a n dxi − ki delivery is not excluded, but
implies (by d>0) higher unit cost. The assumption that demand must be served
4avoids complicated and debatable assumptions concerning demand rationing in
case of excess demand and subgames with equilibria in mixed pricing strategies
(see Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983, and the discussion of their model by Davidson
and Deneckere, 1986).
Rigid capacity constraints in the sense of D =+ ∞ are rather unlikely. Never-
theless we readily admit that the higher cost of excess demand xi − ki will often
question that excess demand is served. Here we concentrate on the possibly less
likely situation where one always serves excess demand.
Since the market is homogeneous, a demand function X (p) must assign a total
(non-negative) demand level X to any non-negative price p not exceeding the pro-
hibitive price. To allow for a simple and parameter free description we assume a
linear demand function whose prohibitive price and satiation level are standard-
ized to 1 (by an appropriate choice of the monetary unit as well as of the unit
amount). Thus the linear demand function c a nb ew r i t t e na s
X (p)=1− p for all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. (II.2)
Market clearing implies, of course,
X (p)=x1 + x2. (II.3)
Furthermore, due to the homogeneity of the market one has
p =m i n{p1,p 2} (II.4)
where for i =1 ,2 the sales price is denoted by pi.T h ep r o ﬁt πi of seller i =1 ,2
is determined by ki,p i and p as follows:
Πi (ki,p i,p)=

      
      
−Ci (ki,0) for pi >p= pj
pxi − Ci (ki,x i) for p1 = p2 = p










Except for the special case p1 = p = p2 our assumptions are standard ones. For
p1 = p = p2 demand is distributed such that each seller encounters a demand level
as close to his capacity as possible. If, for instance, X (p)=k1 + k2 both sellers
i =1 ,2 will sell xi = ki even when ki 6= kj for i 6= j.T h u si nc a s eo fe q u a lp r i c e s
total excess demand 1−p−k1−k2 is distributed equally. This assumption can be
justiﬁed as equal burden sharing among all eﬃcient redistributions of demands.
For other selections, e.g. when individual burdens are proportional to capacities,
a similar analysis is possible.
The decision process describes the timing of decisions and what is learnt about
them, i.e. when sellers make which choices under which information conditions.
A seller ﬁrst chooses his capacity what can be done before (stage K)o ra f t e r
(stage k) the realization c of the random variable C. Similarly, he can thereafter
determine his price before (stage M) or after (stage m) the realization of the
random variable D. As usual in stage games all former decisions are commonly
known. The process is graphically illustrated and explained by Figure 1.
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Figure 1: The market decision process (seller i =1 ,2 can determine his capacity
ki either in period K or, after the realization c of the random variable C,i np e r i o d
k; thereafter the sales prices pi are chosen either in period M or, after the choice
d of the random variable D,i np e r i o dm; when deciding all former decisions are
known)
Endogenous timing assumes that one determines strategically when to decide. An
alternative is to view timing dispositions as basic (inherited or culturally acquired)
6traits which are subject to (genetical or cultural) evolutionary selection. In indi-
rect evolution rational decisions are derived for all possible constellations of such
individual traits. With the help of these results one then deﬁnes an evolutionary
model to determine the evolutionarily stable constellations of individual traits.
Thus an indirect evolutionary analysis allows to combine rational choice making
(here of the capacities and the prices on the various stages of market interaction)
with predetermined timing dispositions (here being early or late in choosing ca-
pacities or prices). The latter dispositions represent actual forward looking choices
before period K when interpreting our model as an exercise in endogenous timing.
In other words, viewing our study as an approach in endogenous timing means
to interpret the model as a grand game in which every individual has to make
four decisions, time and size of capacities as well as of prices have to be ﬁxed. In
the context of indirect evolution one instead considers the game in which sellers
only choose the size of capacity and of prices whereas timing dispositions are part
of their personal characteristics. Having solved this game one then determines
which constellations of timing dispositions are evolutionarily stable.

















We refer to their means as c and d. Of course, one generally needs conditions
guaranteeing 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and non-negative individual sales levels as well as capaci-
ties. We will conﬁne ourselves to check these conditions for the solution outcomes
only. Sellers are assumed to be risk neutral.
3. Optimal behavior for given timing dispositions
What has to be derived here are the optimal prices p∗
i as well as the optimal
capacities k∗
















of timing dispositions for choosing capacities. Since capacities are known when
choosing prices, backward induction in the sense of subgame perfect equilib-
ria (Selten, 1965, 1975) requires to solve ﬁrst the (m1,m 2)-constellations before
investigating capacity choices.
a) The case (m1,m 2)=( m,m)
What one encounters here is a deterministic (both, c and d are commonly known
in period m) duopoly market with piecewise linear cost functions. If p1 6= p2,
one seller would encounter 0-demand. Thus there can be no equilibrium in pure
pricing strategies with p1 6= p2.
We now consider constellations p1 = p2 = p. For any capacity vector (k1,k 2) let
p(k1,k 2) denote the price for which
X (p(k1,k 2)) = k1 + k2 (III.a.1)
holds, i.e. p(k1,k 2)=1− k1 − k2. It is interesting that our model allows for
more than just one pricing equilibrium (p1,p 2) with p1 = p2 = p. A seller i,w h o
underbids the common price p, has to serve the whole market demand at the lower
price p. Thus the positive cost of serving positive excess demand in the sense of
X (pi)=1− pi >k i
can prevent any attempt to underbid a common price p = p1 = p2.H e r e w e
will neglect the multiplicity of pricing equilibria and simply impose the solution
p∗
1 = p∗
2 = p(k1,k 2) for which we now prove the equilibrium property. The chances
of (p∗
1,p ∗
2) to result from equilibrium selection are discussed later (Appendix).
Although the results implied by familiar concepts (payoﬀ and risk dominance)
are not generally encouraging, it is interesting that in an experimental study of
8a related heterogenous duopoly market (Anderhub, Güth, Kamecke, Normann,
2000) the behavior p∗
1 = p∗
2 = p(k1,k 2) was close to being universally observed.
When checking the equilibrium property for p∗
1 = p∗
2 = p(k1,k 2) one obtains that
pi >p ∗





2 = p(k1,k 2) (III.a.2)
to be in equilibrium one therefore only has to guarantee that a marginal price
decrease from (III.a.2) is worse than p∗
i = p(k1,k 2). Comparing
p
∗
iki − Ci (ki,k i) (III.a.3)
and
pi (1 − pi) − Ci (ki,1 − pi), (III.a.4)
where pi is only marginally smaller than 1−ki−kj, shows that no marginal price
cut pays if
(c + d)kj ≥ (1 − ki − kj)kj (III.a.5)
or, for kj > 0,
c + d ≥ p(k1,k 2)=1− k1 − k2. (III.a.5’)
Due to c,d ≥ 1
2 and ki ≥ 0 for i =1 ,2 this condition is always fulﬁlled.
b) The case (m1,m 2)=( M,M)
All what is changed here compared to the case (m1,m 2)=( m,m) is that sellers
i =1 ,2 do not know the actual realization of d. Proceeding in the same way thus
yields the condition
c + d ≥ 1 − k1 − k2 (III.b.1)
9which is less stringent than (III.a.5’) and thus always fulﬁlled.
c) The case (m1,m 2)=( M,m)
Assume that seller 1 does not know d, but seller 2 does. Clearly, in case of (III.a.5’)
and thus also of (III.b.1) neither seller has an incentive to slightly undercut the
price p(k1,k 2). When deriving the results for the various timing constellations of
“capacity” choices the results of the later decision stage are anticipated.
d) The case (n1,n 2)=( k,k)
In case of (n1,n 2)=( k,k) capacities are chosen knowing the realization c.A s -
suming that always the prices p(k1,k 2) result (see the section a), b) and c) above)
seller i’s proﬁt depends on ki as follows:
Πi (ki,k j)=( 1− ki − kj)ki − cki (III.d.1)






for i =1 ,2, (III.d.2)
i.e. the well-known duopoly solution (Cournot, 1838). Since c ≤ 1 the optimal





for i =1 ,2 (III.d.3)
where E {·} denotes the expectation operator.
e) The case (n1,n 2)=( K,K)






for i =1 ,2 (III.e.1)















for i =1 ,2 (III.e.2)






f) The case (n1,n 2)=( K,k)
Assume that seller 1 does not yet know c whereas seller 2 does. From
Π2 (k1,k 2)=( 1− k1 − k2)k2 − ck2 (III.f.1)








2 for 0 ≤ k1 ≤ 1 − c
0f o r k1 > 1 − c.
(III.f.2)
In order to determine seller 1’s optimal capacity level k∗
1 we ﬁrst have to calculate
his expected proﬁt as a function of k1. This function E {π1 (k1)} depends crucially
on the distribution of C. In the following we will carry out the analysis for various
diﬀerent distributions. First we examine the case in which the distribution of
C has a continuous Lebesgue-density and solve the special case of a uniform
distribution explicitly. Then, as an example for measures with ﬁnite support,
we study one-point measures and give one numerical example for a two-point
measure.
f1) Continuous distributions
In this case seller 1’s expected proﬁti s
E {Π1 (k1)} =

       






















and Ψ(·) its distribution with





=0 , Ψ(1) = 1. Equation (III.f.3) can be rewritten as
E {Π1 (k1)} =

      

















E {Π1 (k1)} =

    
    
−1−k1






+(1− k1)k1 − ck1
. (III.f.3”)
From the ﬁrst order condition of a local maximum of (III.f.3) one obtains











cϕ(c)dc = c (III.f.4)
as an implicit formula for the interior maximum k∗




E {π1 (k1)} = −2+Ψ(1 − k1) −
k1
2







Thus E {π1 (k1)} is strictly concave, i.e. the ﬁrst order conditions are necessary
and suﬃcient for a global maximum, and the left-hand side of equation (III.f.4)
is strictly decreasing. By inserting k1 =0and k1 = 1
2 into (III.f.4) one can now



























































1 denote the proﬁt expectation of seller 1 resulting from k∗
1 and the subse-
quent choice k∗
2 (k∗
1) by seller 2. Let, furthermore, Π∗
2 be the corresponding proﬁt
expectation of seller 2 who is second in determining the sales capacity. For the


















































i.e. if preemption takes place, on average, the seller, who ﬁrst determines his
capacity, is worse oﬀ.
f2) One-point measures
We now look at the situation where the distribution of C is a one-point measure,
i.e. where the cost parameter c is no longer random. Obviously this case is
equivalent to the classical (von Stackelberg, 1934) leadership model.
Maximizing seller 1’s expected proﬁtf u n c t i o n
E {π1 (k1)} =
(
(1 − k1 − k∗
2 (k1)) · k1 − c · k1 if 0 ≤ k1 ≤ 1 − c





























13Clearly, in contrast to the case of a uniform distribution, the position of the leader
is more proﬁtable than the one of the follower.
f3) Two-point measures
As a ﬁnal example we analyze the case where C can have exactly two values c1
and c2 with c1 <c 2. Since solving the maximization problems for arbitrary two-
point measures involves a complex case distinction, we restrict ourselves to one
numerical example. Let the distribution of C be the measure assigning probability
1/2 to the numbers c1 =0 .69 and c2 =0 .81, respectively.
The expected proﬁt of seller 1 is









4 (1 − k1)+1
4c1 − c
o
if c2 > 1 − k1 and c1 ≤ 1 − k1
k1 ·{ 1 − k1 − c} if c1 > 1 − k1
(III.f.12)











0.0925 if c = c1










2} ≈ 0.0048 (III.f.16)
Here again, as in the case of one-point measures, the seller who preempts is more
successful than his opponent.
4. The truncated or evolutionary game
In general, the market decision process in Figure 1 allows for four constellations
of individual timing dispositions, namely (K,M), (K,m), (k,M),a n d(k,m).F o r
14our purposes it suﬃces that a stable timing dispositions is a unique best reply to
itself, i.e. a symmetric equilibrium (the concept of evolutionarily stable strategies
imposes an additional condition when the best reply is not unique). Here the task
of deriving the stable timing dispositions is, however, reduced to the problem
whether both will be of type K or k or whether the bimorphisms with one being
of type K and the other of type k are stable. This is implied by our assumption
that equilibrium prices on the second stage (of the Kreps-Scheinkman-model)
induce full capacity utilization, i.e. p∗
i = p(k1,k 2) for i =1 ,2. If this holds for all
constellations (k1,k 2) of capacities, it obviously does not matter whether one sets
one’s price before or after the parameter d is randomly determined.
According to indirect evolution timing dispositions regarding capacities are not
consciously chosen, but rather evolve. The stable timing constellation is thus
viewed as the ﬁnal result of an evolutionary process. Endogenous timing assumes
instead that timing dispositions are consciously and independently determined
before stage K in Figure 1 and then publicly announced. The entries of Table
2a r et h ee x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀs of seller 1 resulting from the optimal capacity vectors
(k∗
1,k ∗




2) for the four












Table 2: The symmetric evolutionary game or truncation as deﬁned by Π∗
1
For the case at hand the distinction between indirect evolution and endogenous
timing matters more for the interpretation rather than for the nature of the results.
15To give an example assume that (k∗,K∗) and thus (due to symmetry) also (K∗,k ∗)
is stable. For indirect evolution this would mean that both bimorphisms are stable
and that it depends on the initial state of the evolutionary process and possibly on
random results which of the two will actually prevail, i.e. the ﬁnal results would
be path dependent.
In view of endogenous timing such a result would be more troublesome since
one cannot recommend which timing disposition a seller should choose without
equilibrium selection (e.g. Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). There also exists a mixed
strategy equilibrium which is, however, non-strict and therefore a less suitable
solution candidate.
A general analysis of Table 2 for all distributions ϕ(·) allows no informative
results. We therefore concentrate on speciﬁc distributions ϕ(·) for which we have
determined the expected proﬁts E {Π∗
1} and E {Π∗
2}. For the special case of the
uniform distribution with ϕ(c)=2for all 1
2 ≤ c ≤ 1 Table 2 becomes
seller 2 k K
seller 1
k 1
108 = .009 .01
K .007 1
144 = .007
Table 2’: The special case of the uniform density ϕ(c)=2for 1
2 ≤ c ≤ 1
If C is constant, i.e. the distribution of C is a one-point measure with C ≡ c,
T a b l e2i so ft h ef o r m












Table 2”: The case of a one-point distribution C ≡ c
16For the numerical case of the two-point measure introduced in section 3.f3) Table
2 is of the form




Table 2”’: The two-point measure where C =0 .69 and C =0 .81,e a c hw i t h
probability 1
2
We now turn to the question whether k or K will ﬁnally evolve, respectively be
chosen strategically.
5. The evolutionarily stable or optimal timing constellation
For the special case of the uniform density the unambiguous result is the constel-
lation (k,k).T h i si st r u es i n c et h ee x p e c t e dp r o ﬁtf o rk is always larger than the
one for K (see Table 2’). Thus k strictly dominates K and is both, the unique
evolutionarily stable strategy of Table 2’ as well as the only optimal timing dis-
position.
If the distribution of C is concentrated on c we again obtain a unique evolutionarily
stable strategy as long as c 6=1 .T a b l e2 ”s h o w st h a tK strictly dominates k.T h i s
result is very intuitive: The realization of c is of no interest at all, thus (K,K)
and (k,k) lead to equal proﬁts. But choosing K instead of k oﬀers each seller
the chance to substitute a (Cournot) duopoly by a (von Stackelberg) leadership
model with him in the leading position and avoids the risk of ending as a follower.
Table 2”’ proves that in our example of a two-point measure, as in the case
of one-point measures, K strictly dominates k. Whereas in the deterministic
17case C ≡ c the capacities in the unique strict equilibrium (K,K) equaled those
for the timing disposition (k,k), we have now found an example where ex post
equilibrium capacities deviate from the deterministic (Cournot, 1838) duopoly
solution ki = 1−c
3 .W h a t i s j u s t i ﬁed by (K,K) is the analogous solution of a
stochastic duopoly market on which sales amounts are determined before the cost
levels are randomly selected. This result does not hold for all two-point measures.
For other values of c1 and c2 and other probabilities for them the constellation
(k,k) can also be a unique strict equilibrium. Unfortunately we could neither ﬁnd
nor exclude bimorphic equilibria.
More generally, stability or optimality of (k,k) in the sense of (k,k) being a strict






























Quantity competition requires special institutions like commodity or stock ex-
changes which, when they exist, should be appropriately captured by the market
model. The alternative is to rely on the natural and intuitive idea of Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983) who justify quantity competition by a two stage-decision pro-
cess of simultaneous decisions (ﬁrst capacities, then sales prices).
Now simultaneous decision making on two stages is just one of several possibil-
ities. In our model it is possible to preempt on both stages. Even when sellers
18decide simultaneously, they can do this early (before the random choice of cost)
or later (after this chance move). Unfortunately, no general conclusion seems
possible. Especially, up to now we have no general result justifying or rejecting
the implicit assumption of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) that sellers decide si-
multaneously. More speciﬁcally, we could not prove the impossibility of stable
bimorphisms (k,K) nor ﬁnd an example for which such bimorphisms are stable.
Thus the troublesome ambiguity remains although now at a deeper level. Diﬀer-
ent cost densities might imply diﬀerent market decision processes. Simultaneous
or independent market decisions can, furthermore, avoid cost uncertainty (when
both sellers wait) or not (when both sellers preempt).
Our model diﬀers from the one of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) mainly by our
diﬀerent interpretation of “capacities” which appears more natural (usually pro-
duction and sales can be more or less easily varied even beyond their planned
levels). An analysis like ours for the original Kreps and Scheinkman-model is very
diﬃcult or even practically impossible. Whereas our model can be easily extended
to oligopoly markets (see Güth, 1995), the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)
still await such a generalization.
Such advantage has, of course, its price in the form of three crucial and debatable
assumptions, namely: (i) In case of equal prices demand is distributed according to
capacities (see equation (II.6)). (ii) Sellers must serve demand even beyond their
planned sales level. (iii) On the price setting stage the solution p∗
1 = p∗
2 = p(k1,k 2)
is just an ad hoc-selection (see Appendix below). One can justify (i) as a result of
renegotiating the demand distribution by the two sellers. Assumption (ii) could be
valid when not serving a customer would result in losing him forever. The ad hoc-
selection (iii) relies mainly on the intuition that sellers coordinate on prices which
fulﬁll their initial expectations as represented by their total planned sales level
k1 + k2. The experimental results of Anderhub at al. (2000) seem to conﬁrm the
focal role of such prices. Thus the three crucial assumptions are not outrageous,
but their main justiﬁcation is, of course, that they greatly simplify the analysis.
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Appendix
Equilibriumselection for price competition on homogeneous
markets
Due to the obligation to serve all customers price competition on homogeneous
markets may have other equilibria than just p∗
1 = p∗
2 = p(k1,k 2) on which our
previous analysis has been based. Here we want to investigate this possibility in
more detail. By applying the theory of equilibrium selection (Harsanyi and Selten,
1988) we also explore whether one can justify our solution candidate p∗
1 = p∗
2 =
p(k1,k 2). As we have seen before, in equilibrium both sellers set the same price
p.W eﬁrst compare the equilibrium p1 = p2 = p(k1,k 2) to equilibria p1 = p2 = p
with p<p(k1,k 2), then we analogously analyse the case p>p(k1,k 2).
Case A.1: p<p(k1,k 2)
Let (p1,p 2) be an arbitrary strategy constellation p1 = p2 = p with p<p(k1,k 2).
Analogously to the proof of the equilibrium property of p∗
1 = p∗
2 = p(k1,k 2)
in section 3 one can show that this constellation is an equilibrium if and only
if, at price p, production beyond the capacity ki causes losses. More formally,
p1 = p2 = p with p<p(k1,k 2) is a strict equilibrium if and only if
p(1 − p) − (c + di)(1− p − ki) <p k i +( p − c − di)
1 − p − k1 − k2
2
for i =1 ,2
or
21(A.1.A) p<c+ di for i =1 ,2
where di is the value of D individual i expects when setting his price, i.e. d if
seller i has timing disposition M and d if this timing disposition is m.
Since we only want to compare p(k1,k 2) to other equilibria, we focus on those
prices p which fulﬁll the equilibrium condition (A.1.A). In the cases where timing
dispositions are asymmetric, i.e. (m1,m 2)=( m,M) or (M,m), it is obvious
which of the two equilibrium prices p and p(k1,k 2) should be selected, namely the
one which is payoﬀ dominant. Anticipating that the second mover sets the same
price the ﬁrst mover clearly prefers the price which yields higher proﬁts for both
sellers.
It remains to analyse the symmetric cases (M,M) and (m,m), i.e. the situations
where d1 = d2 = d, respectively d1 = d2 = d with d denoting the realization of
the random variable D.T h ep a y o ﬀ implications of all price constellations pi with
pi = p(k1,k 2) or pi = p for i =1 ,2 can be represented as a 2 x 2-bimatrix game
(Table 3) where one can neglect the cost of “capacity” ki since these cost are sunk
on the price setting stage. Of course, one cannot neglect cost which result from
selling more than one’s capacity.
p2 p(k1,k 2) p
p1
(1 − k1 − k2)k1 0
p(k1,k 2)
(1 − k1 − k2)k2 (1 − p)(p − c − d2)+( c + d2)k2




0 pk2 − (p − c − d2)
1−p−k1−k2
2
Table 3: The 2 x 2-bimatrix game for p<p(k1,k 2)
22The equilibrium (p,p) would be payoﬀ dominated by (p∗
1,p ∗
2) when
(1 − k1 − k2)ki >p k i +( p − c − di)




(1 − p − k1 − k2)(2ki + c + di − p) > 0 (A.1’)
holds for i =1 ,2. It is interesting that here the condition for payoﬀ dominance
depends on the sum c+di whereas the corresponding condition (A.7) for the case
p>p (k1,k 2) is completely independent of the cost parameters. Since 1 − p>
k1 + k2 this is equivalent to
2ki + c + di >p . (A.2)
Due to ki ≥ 0 and the equilibrium condition (A.1.A) this is always fulﬁlled. This




Payoﬀ dominance completely neglects the risks implied by coordinating on a spe-
ciﬁc strict equilibrium. Such risks are, however, carefully considered by risk dom-
inance (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) which, for the case at hand, is axiomatically
characterized by three requirements, namely best reply and isomorphic invariance
and monotonicity. Actually the axioms can be constructively used when deriving
which of the two strict equilibria risk dominates the other.
p2 p(k1,k 2) p
p1
(1 − k1 − k2 − c − d1)k1 − (1 − p)(p − c − d1) 0
p(k1,k 2)
(1 − k1 − k2 − c − d2)k2 − (1 − p)(p − c − d2) 0




0 pk2 +( p − c − d2)
1−p−k1−k2
2
23Table 4: A best reply invariant transformation of Table 3
The bimatrix game of Table 4 results from Table 3 by subtracting the non-
equilibrium payoﬀ from the equilibrium payoﬀ for a given strategy of the other
seller, i.e. after such a transformation the non-equilibrium payoﬀ for a given strat-
egy of the other player is 0. The mixed strategy equilibrium in Table 4 is the same
as in Table 3. Thus both games have the same best reply structure, i.e. the same
stability sets (the sets of mixed strategy vectors to which every component of a
pure strategy vector is a best reply). By best reply invariance we can thus solve
the game in Table 4 instead of the one in Table 3.








Table 5: An isomorphic transformation of Table 4 where
X =
(1 − k1 − k2 − c − d1)k1 − (1 − p)(p − c − d1)






pk2 +( p − c − d2)
1−p−k1−k2
2
(1 − k1 − k2 − c − d2)k2 − (1 − p)(p − c − d2)
. (A.4)
Finally, the game of Table 5 results from Table 4 by positively aﬃne transforma-
tions of payoﬀ functions, i.e. by an isomorphic transformation. If X = Y would
24hold, isomorphic invariance in the form of symmetry invariance would prescribe
the mixed strategy equilibrium as the solution. If, however, X 6= Y monotonic-
ity prescribes (p∗
1,p ∗
2) for X>Yand (p1,p 2) for Y> Xas the solution. A
change from a game with X0 = Y 0, where no strict equilibrium is the solution, to
X>X 0 = Y 0 can be seen as strengthening the strict equilibrium (p∗
1,p ∗
2) since
player 1’s incentive to coordinate on (p∗
1,p ∗
2) is increased. Monotonicity requires
that such strengthening induces (p∗
1,p ∗










pki +( p − c − di)














(c + d − p)





revealing a complicated dependence on the various parameters k1, k2, d = d1 = d2,
and p with p<p(k1,k 2).
Case A.2: p>p(k1,k 2)
As for the other case we ﬁrst state the condition under which p1 = p2 = p is
an equilibrium and then explore the conditions for payoﬀ and risk dominance of
(p∗
1,p ∗
2) over (p1,p 2) for the cases of symmetric timing dispositions (M,M) and
(m,m). In the asymmetric cases again the payoﬀ dominant equilibrium will be
selected.
The indicator function 1A assumes the value 1 on A and 0 otherwise. The con-
stellation p1 = p2 = p is an equilibrium if and only if
p(1 − p) − (c + di)(1− p − ki) · 1{1−p−k1>0} <p
1 − p + ki − kj
2
for i =1 ,2 and j 6= i or
25(A.2.A) 1 − p>k i for i =1 ,2
and








for i,j =1 ,2 with i 6= j.
As mentioned earlier, the multiplicity of equilibria is due to the assumption that
a seller i with the lower price must serve the whole market. If total demand
exceeds his capacity, i.e. condition (A.2.A) is fulﬁlled, then the cost of the excess
demand 1 − p − ki might be higher than the additional surplus resulting from
underbidding the common price. For this (A.2.B) is a necessary and suﬃcient
condition. The payoﬀs of all price constellations pi with pi = p(k1,k 2) or pi = p
are again represented as a 2 x 2-bimatrix game in Table 6. As in Table 3 the cost
of ki is neglected. Clearly (p∗
1,p ∗
2) and (p,p) are both strict equilibria of this game.
p2 p(k1,k 2) p
p1
(1 − k1 − k2)k1 (1 − k1 − k2)(k1 + k2) − (c + d1)k2
p(k1,k 2)





(1 − k1 − k2)(k1 + k2) − (c + d2)k1 p
1−p−k1+k2
2
Table 6: The 2 x 2-bimatrix game for p>p(k1,k 2)




2 = p(k1,k 2) payoﬀ dominates (p1,p 2)
with p1 = p2 = p>p(k1,k 2) when
(1 − k1 − k2)ki >p
1 − p + ki − kj
2
for i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j. (A.7)
26For risk dominance of (p∗
1,p ∗
2) one needs again that X>Ywhere now
X =
(1 − k1 − k2)k1
p
1−p+k1−k2






2 − (1 − k1 − k2)(k1 + k2)+( c + d2)k1
(1 − k1 − k2)k2
. (A.9)
To illustrate the chances that (p∗
1,p ∗
2) payoﬀ dominates (p1,p 2) assume k1 = k2 = k
so that (A.7) simpliﬁes to
(1 − 2k)2k>p(1 − p). (A.10)
Thus payoﬀ dominance typically depends on whether (p∗
1,p ∗
2) or (p1,p 2) generates
the larger total revenue. In other words: Only capacity vectors (k1,k 2),w h o s e
sums do not exceed the monopoly supply of 1/2,c a n n o tb ep a y o ﬀ dominated by
price vectors (p1,p 2) with p1 = p2 = p>p(k1,k 2).
A larger sum c + d1 = c + d2 reduces X and increases Y . I tt h u sd o e sn o t
only improve the chances of an alternative strict equilibrium (p1,p 2) according to
(A.2.B), but also that this alternative solution risk dominates the solution (p∗
1,p ∗
2).
By this we only wanted to illustrate how to derive a unique solution of the price





2 = p(k1,k 2) is selected or not. A complete
solution for all possible subgames would have to rely on a (too) complicated case
distinction.
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